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I. INTRODUCTION
In two important books, The Republic of Choice1 and The Horizontal Society,
2
published in 1990 and 1999 respectively, Lawrence M. Friedman presents his theories of
a massive social transformation which occurred in the last century. I wish to examine
these theories through the prism of two cases: Elk Grove Unified School District v.
Newdow 3 and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,4 both decided in the spring of 2004. Both Newdow
and Hamdi have been at the center of public controversy for many months; each case
carries many of the ingredients presented in Friedman's The Republic of Choice and The
Horizontal Society. I shall present these cases, show how they reflect themes explored in
The Republic of Choice and The Horizontal Society, and pose some questions about the
horizons of the explanatory powers of Friedman's theory.
Friedman's theory, which he more recently integrated into his American Law in the
Twentieth Century,5 presents two models of society: traditional and modem, or vertical
and horizontal. The traditional, vertical society is typified by a clear hierarchical
structure, fixed preordained identities, and minimal mobility. 6  For its members, the
future looks pretty much like the present and the present looks pretty much like the past.
7
Friedman observes that in the twentieth century most societies have undergone a radical
transformation, from the vertical to the horizontal society. 8 The vertical structure has
been breaking down in favor of a loose-fitting societal structure where people are, as
Friedman says, like rolling stones, mobile, free to make choices, feeling entitled to
change the present, and full of hopes for a future that better reflects their expectations
and choices.
9
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I wish to thank Alexandra Diaz-Almaral, Jeffrey
Mosczyc, Gopi Patel, and Amudha K. Poola for research and editorial assistance. Thanks also to the legal
history roundtable at Boston College Law School for excellent comments during my presentation of this paper.
1. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Republic of Choice: Law, Authority, and Culture (Harv. U. Press 1990).
2. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Horizontal Society (Yale U. Press 1999).
3. 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
4. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
5. Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law in the Twentieth Century (Yale U. Press 2002).
6. Friedman, supra n. 2, at 5.
7. Id. at 20.
8. Id. at 5.
9. Friedman, supra n. 1, at 9, 11.
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I cannot argue with this basic insight. My aunt, Marcelle Nissan, who passed away
last spring, epitomized this process perfectly. She was born into a very patriarchal
family in Iran, where father ruled supreme and mother was illiterate. The name her
father chose for her, Marcelle, disclosed his aspirations to identify with the West
(France) and some willingness to loosen his traditional moorings. In 1934, he moved his
family to Palestine, and the twelve-year-old Marcelle rapidly abandoned her traditional
values in favor of the modem. She still knew when to kiss the hands of elders to show
respect, and instinctively jumped to serve any male, adult or child, before that person
even realized he needed service. Yet Marcelle dared to smoke, wore a bikini, fought in
Israel's war of independence, and refused an arranged marriage, all to the great
consternation of her mother. She ended up a single woman, an owner of a prosperous
boutique, and an enthusiastic explorer who jumped on every opportunity to go to the
movies, attend a lecture, and travel to exotic places. She was a classic representative of
the horizontal society and proof of the fundamental changes in consciousness that have
revolutionized the world in the twentieth century as analyzed by Friedman's scholarship.
The two Supreme Court cases I chose to address are excellent materials with which
to reflect on Friedman's theories. In Newdow, the Court considered a challenge to the
presence of the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance.' 0 The Pledge reads: "I
pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for
which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."'"
Michael A. Newdow argued that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution 12 does not permit the recognition of God in an official and
daily patriotic exercise in public school classrooms.13
In Hamdi, a citizen of both the United States and Saudi Arabia was captured in
Afghanistan during the battle between the Taliban and American military forces, and
challenged President George W. Bush's decision to hold him in military custody
indefinitely. 14 What makes Newdow and Hamdi excellent examples of the horizontal
society?
II. DR. NEWDOW AND MR. HAMDI: MEMBERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE
Michael Newdow is a doctor and a lawyer. His professions by themselves qualify
Dr. Newdow as a respectable member of the horizontal society, where mobility and
experimentation are significant trends. 15 In the horizontal society, one is not confined to
a single professional pursuit, but is largely free to re-invent oneself at different stages of
one's life. Dr. Newdow's family situation is anything but traditional. Neither married
nor divorced, he fathered a daughter and has been committed to partaking in her
10. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2305.
11. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (1954). For a history of the Pledge, see Richard J. Ellis, To the Flag: The Unlikely History
of the Pledge ofAllegiance (U. Press Kan. 2005).
12. The Establishment Clause states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. Const. amend. I.
13. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2303; see Restore Our Pledge of Allegiance, Mike Newdow,
http://www.restorethepledge.com/mike_.newdow/ (accessed Oct. 7, 2005).
14. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2633, 2636.
15. Friedman, supra n. 2, at 228.
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education and development. A scientist at heart-another mark of the horizontal society,
which is so much a part of the idea of progress-Dr. Newdow is an avowed atheist, a
member of a "society of atheists," and even a distinguished member of this society. 16 As
Friedman points out, the horizontal society is a hotbed for the development of many
subnations. 17 People get together to form groups that reflect their special interests in
order to nurture communal feelings of solidarity and to promote their point of view in the
public sphere. 18 The society of atheists of which Dr. Newdow is a member is a good
example of such a group or subnation. Because of his atheistic worldview, Dr. Newdow
adamantly disagrees with the current formulation of the Pledge of Allegiance.
Dr. Newdow fits the horizontal society in other ways as well. His specialty is
emergency medicine, a relatively new specialty, designed to meet the many perils
accompanying a hectic modem society, which has come to depend on a panoply of
dangerous instruments. His motives to push the Pledge litigation all the way to the
Supreme Court in Washington, D.C., and make the oral argument all by himself, may
also fit neatly within the concept of the horizontal society. More than one motive may
drive a man to invest so much time, energy, and resources in a legal battle. Perhaps Dr.
Newdow was driven by the principle of atheism; conceivably, his daughter's best
interests fueled his professional zeal. Fame may also have fed his energy. In The
Republic of Choice, Friedman discusses the pervasiveness of celebrity culture in modem
society. 19 "[C]elebrities," he astutely observes, are "the new heroes, the new models, the
shepherds" 20 of the horizontal society. Fame makes one a celebrity; Dr. Newdow may
have consciously or subconsciously understood that the Pledge litigation was a golden
opportunity to attain his fifteen minutes of celebrity status.
2 1
Friedman also warns us not to assume that the transformation from the vertical or
traditional to the horizontal or modem society is anywhere near completion. He points
out that "Some elements of culture ... are indeed tough, autonomous, and resistant to
change. ' 22 Patriarchy, a central pillar of the traditional society, 23 is important to Dr.
Newdow's case. He wishes to shape his daughter's identity in his image, that of an
atheist who does not believe in God. Even if Dr. Newdow is more tolerant, and
understands that his daughter is free to believe in God, his insistence that she be
encouraged to consider the menu of identity choices, including that of atheism, makes
him a patriarch-a man who knows what choices others should contemplate.
Traditionalism also plays an important role in Dr. Newdow's case. The mother of
Dr. Newdow's daughter is a born-again Christian who influenced the five-year-old Ms.
16. See Restore Our Pledge of Allegiance, supra n. 13.
17. Friedman, supra n. 2, at 104. "These groups could never come alive without the skills and technology
of a horizontal society." Id.
18. Id.
19. Friedman, supra n. 1, at 112-30.
20. Id. at 113.
21. See Andy Warhol's famous principle, "In the future, everyone will be famous for at least 15 minutes."
The Vanishing American Hero, U.S. News & World Rpt. 16 (July 21, 1975).
22. Friedman, supra n. 1, at 203.
23. Friedman, supra n. 2, at 5.
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Newdow, their daughter, to embrace her faith.24  Becoming a born-again Christian,
Friedman might argue, is simply another step in the endless search for personal identity
and meaning, so typical of the horizontal society. 25 Besides, as I already mentioned,
Friedman does not ignore the existence of pockets of traditionalism in modem society.
Rather, he urges us to see these pockets as marginal symptoms which should not cloud a
bigger picture.2 6 Thus, regardless of its vertical elements, Dr. Newdow's case fits neatly
into Friedman's horizontal theory.
Friedman devotes considerable space in The Republic of Choice to discussing a
major dimension of the horizontal society: the culture of rights.2 7 He views the culture
of rights as one of the most important developments in this century and a cardinal
characteristic of the horizontal society. Friedman opens The Republic of Choice with a
report on "a remarkable dialogue between a homeless black man and a reporter"28 in
New York City in the winter of 1985. It was a nasty winter and the City decided to
evacuate its homeless into municipal shelters. 29 "The black man complained with great
vigor about the city's plan. 'They can't do that to us,' he said .... 'We've got
rights.'30
Dr. Newdow's claim of rights may be divided into two parts. One part of his claim
is a traditional right-a parental right to be involved in his daughter's education. The
second part is the right he believes follows from his parental right: he insists that he has a
right to edit the Pledge of Allegiance. This is a right with audacious implications: Dr.
Newdow wants the Court to remove the generally beloved, awe-inspiring phrase "under
God" from the Pledge of Allegiance. 3 1 The resulting surgery performed upon the Pledge
would be dramatic. It would force the severance of the formal ties between God and
Nation. Only a full appreciation of the radical nature of Dr. Newdow's claimed right can
clarify the extent to which he is such a perfect member of Friedman's horizontal society,
and a creature of the culture of rights. One individual feels entitled to change the law
and customs of the majority to suit his identity needs as an atheist parent.
Indeed, the vertical dimension again raises its stubborn head. A parental right is
hierarchical and clashes with the modem idea of children's rights. Dr. Newdow's
daughter strongly rejects her father's philosophy. She feels she has a right to pledge
allegiance to a Nation under God.32 As we saw above, Friedman may argue that this is
precisely his point. The vertical and the horizontal are symbiotically intertwined. The
24. Br. for Sandra L. Banning in Support of the Pets. for Cert. at *10, Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2003 WL
23055033. "Neither Ms. Banning nor her daughter objects to saying the Pledge in the course of daily patriotic
exercises in public school." Id. at *10.
25. See Friedman, supra n. 2, at 5-6.
26. Id. at 209.
27. Friedman, supra n. 1, at 2. "Rights, laws, free choice: these are crucial terms and ideas in modem
Western society." Id.
28. Id. at 1.
29. Id.
30. Id. People do not in fact have as many rights as they think they do, but the important point Friedman is
making is not empirical. It is the feeling that one is protected by a bundle of rights that matters in his theory.
31. See Respts. Br. on the Merits at *2-3, Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2004 WL 314156 (stating that the
insertion of "under God" in the Pledge is an "example of the majority using the machinery of the state to
enforce its preferred religious orthodoxy").
32. Br. for Sandra L. Banning in Support of the Pets. for Cert., supra n. 24 and accompanying text.
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THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE
idea that children may have rights, that their voice should be heard, is itself a symptom
of the culture of rights, an important aspect of the horizontal society.
There is symmetry between some facts in Newdow and Hamdi. In both cases, a
father appears before the Court to argue on behalf of his child.33 Dr. Newdow wants his
daughter to be free to respect, and perhaps adopt his atheism. The father of Yaser Esam
Hamdi, Esam Fouad Hamdi (or Himdi), 34 wants his son released from solitary
confinement in the United States and returned to his home in Saudi Arabia.3 5 In the
mind of the father, his son was still a boy and "'Boys like to try things new.' ... 'He had
never traveled outside Saudi Arabia before. He decided to show "I am a man."' ' 36 Mr.
Hamdi, however, was not a child; he was twenty-four years old. His total dependence on
what Friedman calls the "tender mercies" 37 of American soldiers (if you wish, his hope
that they do as the Pledge instructs them and allow him, too, to taste of the bounty of
"liberty and justice"), 38 and his utter helplessness as a man without rights should remind
us of children.
A look at pictures of the young Hamdi prior to his ordeal gives the impression that
he is a rather traditional person. He is photographed wearing the traditional male Arab
headscarf, kaffiyah, and in one picture (after his release, where he was posing for the
press) he also wears the traditional white robe, or dishdasha.39  The traditional Arab
uniform certainly sends a message of keeping his distance from Western values. Mr.
Hamdi grew up in Saudi Arabia in a home that valued family honor and patriarchy.
40
Because there has been little access to Mr. Hamdi, all we know about his personal life
comes from his father.4 1 According to Mr. Hamdi's father, Hamdi was a student of
marketing at King Fahd University when he left for Afghanistan in the summer of
33. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301; Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633. Next friend habeas petitions on behalf of Yaser
Essam Hamdi were brought before the federal district court by Frank Willard Dunham, Jr., the public defender,
and Christian A. Peregrin, a private citizen. As these petitions were pending, Esam Fouad Hamdi, Yaser's
father, filed his own petition as his son's next friend. These petitions were challenged by the United States
government. On June 26, 2002, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the public defender and the
private citizen did not have standing to file a next friend petition. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir.
2002). The Fourth Circuit did, however, permit Esam Fouad Hamdi's petition to be considered. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002).
34. Joel Brinkley, From Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia, via Guantanamo, 154 N.Y. Times A4 (Oct. 16,
2004). This article tells us that his name has been misspelled and mispronounced, and actually is "Himdi."
The article refers to Yaser as Hamdi (the name familiar to Americans), but to his father as Himdi. The ordeal
from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan to Guantanamo to the United States and back to Saudi Arabia, thus, ended in
a formal separation of father and son, at least as far as their recognized names are concerned. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Friedman, supra n. 2, at 67. Without courts, people will be "exposed to the tender mercies of the
people in power." Id.
38. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
39. Brinkley, supra n. 34.
40. In an interview, Esam Hamdi said that his family was "respected in Saudi Arabia" (hardly something
one imagines hearing from the father of John Walker Lindh, the first American Taliban), and that "We believe
in our religion that because parents are the main cause of our existence on earth, our duties toward them are
very big." Tony Bartelme, Born in Louisiana, Captured in Afghanistan, Jailed in Hanahan: Yaser Hamdi
Travels Long, Strange Road, Post & Courier (Charleston, S.C.) 1A, 14A (Mar. 7, 2004).
41. Bartelme's article was written prior to Mr. Hamdi's release, at a time when almost no information was
available about him. It appears that after his release, Mr. Hamdi has refrained from talking to the press.
2005]
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2001.42 His voyage to Afghanistan to search for a more meaningful and personally
invigorating Islam makes him similar to Mrs. Newdow and her daughter, who also
pursue a fundamentalist experience in order to add meaning to life.4 3 The United States
claims that once in Afghanistan, Hamdi joined the Taliban. The Hamdi family denies a
Taliban connection. Regardless of which side tells the truth, all agree that after
September 1 th Mr. Hamdi was caught by the Northern Coalition and handed over to the
American forces. He was classified as an "enemy combatant" and flown to Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. Once it was discovered that he was born in the United States, he was
removed to a military brig in the United States and held in solitary confinement for more
than two and a half years. 44 Mr. Hamdi was released on October 11, 2004.
4 5
The most striking difference between Dr. Newdow and Mr. Hamdi is the role of
God in their lives. One of the formative experiences in Dr. Newdow's life is his
campaign to banish God's name from the public sphere. The most formative experience
in young Hamdi's life is his current ordeal. In a letter to his father, Mr. Hamdi writes:
"My father, I think Allah is punishing me because I left without informing you and
getting your permission.
4 6
Mr. Hamdi, then, not only believes in God, Allah, but also in an omnipresent and
controlling God who keeps a detailed record of every step mortals take. Mr. Hamdi
believes that he has been receiving his comeuppance for leaving Saudi Arabia for
Afghanistan without his parents' permission. Consider the twenty-four-year-old
Hamdi's crucible-a hitherto sheltered member of the Saudi middle class, caught in a
bloody military conflict at age twenty, escaping by the skin of his teeth from the hellish
uprising in Mazar-e Sharif, and held incommunicado for more than two years in a
military jail, first in Guantanamo, and then in the United States. The fact that Mr. Hamdi
believes that this chain of events was brought upon him by the wrath of God, because he
did not obey his parents, makes clear that in his universe, God is a mighty ferocious
supreme being. Viewed from this perspective, members of the Hamdi family hardly
belong in the "republic of choice." However, Mr. Hamdi's pursuit of faith may also
appear quite similar to Dr. Newdow's. Both are religious zealots, one of atheism and the
other of Islam, and both were prepared to go to great lengths in order to pursue their
personal version of the truth.
Friedman argues and Mr. Hamdi's case shows that no one in our global village is
immune to the effects of the horizontal society. In their native Saudi Arabia, the Himdis
probably qualify as members of the horizontal avant-garde. Mr. Hamdi's grandfather
42. Bartelme, supra n. 40.
43. "As a friend of Mr. Hamdi said in an interview, 'His agenda was to take a sabbatical from school and
try to get his head straight, to live in a strict Islamic environment with other young men like himself.'
Brinkley, supra n. 34, at A4.
44. Hamdi's petition to the Supreme Court notes, "'Pakistani intelligence sources said Northern Alliance
commanders could receive $5,000 for each Taliban prisoner and $20,000 for a[n] [all Qaeda fighter. As a
result, bounty hunters rounded up any men who came near the battlegrounds and forced them to confess."' Pet.
for Writ of Cert. at n. 8, Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2003 WL 23170355 (quoting Jan McGirk, Fighting Terror,
Boston Globe A30 (Nov. 17, 2002)).
45. Brinkley, supra n. 34.
46. Bartelme, supra n. 40, at 15A.
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was the chair of the chamber of commerce in Mecca, 47 through which he must have been
familiarized with travel and exposed to people from other lands and cultures. Because of
Britain's involvement in Saudi Arabia after World War I, it seems reasonable to assume
that grandfather Hamdi was somewhat exposed to the West, at least to its colonial-
British version.
Two of Mr. Hamdi's uncles are doctors.4 8 Like Dr. Newdow, their education
exposed them to the rational and scientific way of thinking required by modem
medicine. Mr. Hamdi's father may wear a dishdasha and a kaffiyah instead of a suit and
a tie, he may hold traditional values, but he attended a univerity, like his brothers, and
graduated with a degree in engineering. As an engineer (the quintessential profession of
the age of progress), Mr. Hamdi's father was sufficiently adventurous to choose to
relocate to the United States for five full years, and in an interview he even insisted that
he had enjoyed his American sojourn.4 9
A small detail of young Hamdi's lifestyle perhaps best reveals his modernist
profile; he, the student of marketing, owned a cell phone.50 Friedman emphasizes that
one of the most salient aspects of the horizontal society is the explosion in means of
communication. 5 1 Mr. Hamdi's cell phone signals his modernity. He is just like other
young men of his generation, whether in the Middle East, Asia, or the United States. Mr.
Hamdi's parents realized that their son had left Saudi Arabia without their permission
when his cell phone fell silent.52 What did Mr. Hamdi have to say when admonished
about leaving Saudi Arabia without securing his parents' consent? His uncle reports that
his nephew said that "he was an adult now and could do what he wanted."5 3 Mr. Hamdi,
then, may have been a Taliban, may not have been the most typical member of the
horizontal society, and may have since repented his sins. Yet at one time, Mr. Hamdi did
think of himself as entitled to make his own choices, a quality that makes him a member
of the republic of choice.
The right that Mr. Hamdi asks for, and that his father asks on his behalf, is the right
to a writ of habeas corpus. Mr. Hamdi wants the chance to prove to a federal court that
he has never been a Taliban or a member of al Qaeda, and that his liberty is denied him
without due process of law.54 Like the parental right invoked by Dr. Newdow, this is a
fairly conventional, uncomplicated constitutional right. In Newdow, the novelty was
introduced when the remedy sought was the purging of the phrase "under God" from the
Pledge. The novelty of the Hamdi request is his (unarticulated) argument that his rights
47. Id. at 14A.
48. Id.
49. Bartelme, supra n. 40. "Yaser Hamdi's father, Esam, has fond memories of the five years he spent in
the United States. He worked as a petroleum engineer with Exxon Chemicals in the later 1970s and early
1980s, living in Louisiana, Texas and California. 'I had excellent neighbors, and we would go out together.
America felt like home,' he recalled recently in a telephone interview from Saudi Arabia." Id.
50. See id
51. Friedman, supra n. 2, at 16-17.
52. Bartelme, supra n. 40.
53. Id. at 14A.
54. See Br. for Petrs., Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2004 WL 378715. Hamdi claims that the habeas corpus
proceeding was "in name only" and that the Fourth Circuit decision "effectively stripped" Hamdi of his right to
due process by "denying him any meaningful opportunity to challenge the basis for his detention." Id. at * 14.
2005]
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as a dual citizen, who has spent most of this life outside of the United States, are not
different from the rights of a United States citizen whose identity has been rooted in
American culture.
5 5
Thus, an initial comparison between the Newdow and Hamdi stories shows that
each displays strong elements of the horizontal society as described by Friedman. Dr.
Newdow fits the description of the horizontal man almost perfectly. Mr. Hamdi is more
of a hybrid case. Yet he too, is a child of modernity. Dr. Newdow and Mr. Hamdi are
both asking for an affirmation of their constitutional rights.
III. THE HORIZONTAL SOCIETY AND THE CULTURE OF RIGHTS
We now confront another dimension of Friedman's theory: constitutionalism and
judicial review. Friedman takes note of the ubiquity of written constitutions in the
second half of the twentieth century. He writes:
To make a constitutional system work, some mechanism is needed to put muscle behind
the rights of the citizens. Otherwise, they are exposed to the tender mercies of the people
in power. There are a number of such mechanisms. The American contribution to this
delicate art is judicial review. This takes, in the first place, independent courts-powerful,
proud, and determined, and detached from governmental interference. In the second place,
it takes a doctrine or norm which allows (or encourages) these courts to say no to actions
that violate constitutional principle.
5 6
When a constitution is the highest law in the land, it is, by definition, at the top of the
pyramid of norms,57 and a supreme court, likewise, stands at the top of a vertical,
extremely hierarchical judicial system. Friedman sees the jurisprudence of rights
developed by supreme courts as flesh of the flesh of the horizontal society. Maybe this is
proof that the horizontal cannot exist without the vertical, but I shall leave this question
for another time. For now it is enough to observe that judicial review, as practiced by the
United States Supreme Court, is at the heart of Dr. Newdow's and Mr. Hamdi's claims.
Without an acceptance of Chief Justice Marshall's two-century-old axiom that "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," 58
neither Dr. Newdow nor Mr. Hamdi could imagine that the Court had the capacity to
supply a remedy to vindicate his rights.
55. The classification I am proposing here is not dependent on any particular attachment to the United
States, nor to American values. Rather, I am drawing a distinction between someone who did not grow up in
the United States, and presumably did not consider himself an American, and others who may have more
complex relationships with the United States.
56. Friedman, supra n. 2, at 67.
57. See Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Max Knight trans., 2d rev. ed., U. Cal. Press 1967). Kelsen
conceptualized valid norms as always deriving legitimacy from a higher norm. His hierarchy of norms
visualized a pyramid form where the highest source of authority was a constitution and below it layers of
statutes, treaties, regulations, judicial opinions, and ordinances.
58. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). This canonical case already reveals the limits ofjudicial
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On June 14, 2004, the Court rejected Dr. Newdow's petition.59 Two weeks later
the Court partially accepted Mr. Hamdi's petition and ordered the Executive Branch to
grant Mr. Hamdi some procedural rights to which he is entitled under the Constitution.
60
Given the central role of the Constitution in the American political and legal
systems, and given the authoritative role of the Supreme Court, what outcome should we
have expected for Dr. Newdow and Mr. Hamdi? Friedman's theory about the
pervasiveness of the culture of rights should make us expect the Court to uphold both
rights and claims. If the Court were indeed performing its task as a protector of rights, as
Friedman tells us it has been doing in the last quarter of the twentieth century, then one
would expect the Court to affirm the rights of both Dr. Newdow and Mr. Hamdi.
Furthermore, and of no less significance, I suggest that from the doctrinal
perspective, Newdow was an easier case. The body of jurisprudence concerning the
Establishment Clause was rather clear, and I believe that Justice Thomas (concurring)
correctly observed that under current law, the phrase "under God" does not belong in the
61 62Pledge.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the same position. The fact that
a five to three Court denied Dr. Newdow's claim on a technicality (holding that he had
no standing) may itself reveal the Court's determination to sidestep the straightforward
substantive constitutional issues.
Mr. Hamdi's case was somewhat more difficult from the doctrinal perspective.
There has been a dearth of precedential law addressing the question of executive powers
during hostilities, and the clarity of this precedential law has been controversial.63
Furthermore, it was not clear that the Court would be willing to collide with the
executive branch. In the last twenty years, the Court displayed a strong preference for a
powerful executive, and thus might be willing to condone administrative detention of
suspected terrorists. From a doctrinal perspective, and given the post-September 11 th
climate, the Court could be expected to grant Dr. Newdow his right, but possibly deny
Mr. Hamdi his. Why then did the Court accept Mr. Hamdi's petition and deny Dr.
Newdow's, and how does this comport with Friedman's theories?
Friedman may point to a theory that would easily explain these outcomes. One of
Friedman's major contributions to legal theory and history has been the instrumental
conception of law: that law is historically contingent and reactive to social forces.
6 4
Since the beginning of his career, Friedman has taught us to reject the formalist theories
that envision law as independent of society. Instead, Friedman has always insisted that
we must look at law in context and understand the political and social factors which
59. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301.
60. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633. And yet almost three months later, Hamdi was still held incommunicado,
without access to legal counsel and without a judicial review of his version of the facts. Id.
61. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2330 (Justice Thomas states, "as a matter of our precedent, the Pledge policy is
unconstitutional.").
62. See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the endorsement test and
concluding that the statement '"under God' [was] an endorsement of religion.... conveying a message of state
endorsement of a religious belief').
63. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2643, 2669 (Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia disagreeing about the
precedential value of ExParte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 125 (1866) and ExParte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).
64. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 Law & Socy. 1 (1969).
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affect its evolution.65  The political and social circumstances within which Dr.
Newdow's case has evolved suggest that, at the present time, it would be very difficult, if
not impossible, for the Supreme Court to accept Dr. Newdow's claim. A solid body of
scholarship argues that America is a religious country. The Pledge, as it has been recited
since the 1950s, enjoys tremendous public support. After the events of September 11 th
and the declaration of a Global War on Terrorism, the need to reaffirm the covenant
between God and People has grown even stronger. As anecdotal proof, take Harvard
University's political scientist Samuel P. Huntington's recent polemic Who Are We?
6 6
Chapter five, tellingly, is titled "Religion and Christianity," and Huntington opens it by
discussing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that the phrase "under God" in the
Pledge violates the First Amendment. Here is Huntington on the Court of Appeals'
opinion:
The supporters of the court were an articulate but very small minority. The critics were an
outraged and overwhelming majority of all political persuasions. President Bush termed
the decision "ridiculous." The Democratic Senate majority leader, Tom Daschle, called it
"nuts"; Governor George Pataki of New York said it was "junk justice." 67
Moreover:
The Senate passed a resolution, 99 to 0, urging that the decision be reversed, and members
of the House of Representatives gathered on the steps of the Capitol to recite the Pledge
and sing "God Bless America." A Newsweek poll found that 87 percent of the public
supported inclusion of the words while 9 percent opposed.
68
When Friedman tells us the Supreme Court exists to protect the rights of minorities, he is
echoing an honorable American principle dating back to Madison Federalist Ten.
69
However, Friedman also knows that courts respond to social pressure and may find it
very difficult to protect a tiny minority against an overwhelming outraged majority,
especially when the subject matter is God. It is quite easy to argue that in rejecting Dr.
Newdow's plea, the Supreme Court was responding not to the principle of the separation
of church and state, but rather to politics. It was practicing some "passive virtues" or
"minimalism" and attempting to avoid the pitfalls of making a decidedly unappealing
ruling.70 To quote Justice Frankfurter's reaction to another famous citizenship case,
65. Id. See also Lawrence M. Friedman, A History ofAmerican Law (2d ed., Simon & Schuster 1985).
66. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity (Simon &
Schuster 2004).
67. Id. at 82.
68. Id.
69. Friedman, supra n. 2, at 66-67. James Madison cautioned that "measures are too often decided, not
according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minority party, but by the superior force of an interested
and overbearing majority." James Madison, No. 10: The Union A Check on Faction, in The Federalist 54, 55
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., Henry Holt & Co. 1898) (footnote omitted).
70. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 146
(Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1962); see also Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the
Supreme Court (Harv. U. Press 1999). But cf Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues": A
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964).
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which accompanied a famous pledge case, the Justices may have been reading the
newspapers.71
What the Justices were reading in the newspapers about Mr. Hamdi must have
been more controversial. It is possible that the Justices were embarrassed and maybe a
bit alarmed by reports concerning the torture of detainees in the Abu-Ghraib prison in
Iraq, and therefore were inclined to resist the idea that President George W. Bush enjoys
unsupervised and unbridled discretion to detain people without access to a court of law
for as long as he deems necessary. 72 But such a causal relationship is not the same as
arguing that public opinion was in favor of Mr. Hamdi's rights to habeas corpus.
The circumstances surrounding Newdow and Hamdi provide a persuasive
explanation for the question of why the Court denied Dr. Newdow's right but granted
Mr. Hamdi's request for habeas corpus. However, while partially credible, this
explanation does not do justice to Friedman's scholarship. Friedman never argued for a
straightforward causal relationship between historical events and judicial rulings. His
theory of law is complex, addressing a multitude of social forces developing over time,
with undercurrents not always visible to the naked eye, but which affect and shape the
legal system. It is a theory too sophisticated to be discussed as a mere variation on the
character of Mr. Dooley's observation that the Supreme Court follows the election
returns.
73
71. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943), was considered by the Supreme Court at the same
time as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Schneiderman, the Court
considered the constitutionality of stripping a person of his naturalized citizenship. 320 U.S. at 120.
In his journal, Justice Frankfurter recorded the following exchange with Justice Black, a moment after
he asked the Solicitor General whether the government suggested that the Communist Party had no principles:
At which Black turned to me with blazing eyes and ferocity in his voice and said, "The Hearst press
will love that question." I replied, "I don't give a damn whether the Hearst press or any other press
likes or dislikes any question that seems to me relevant to the argument. I am a judge and not a
politician." "Of course," replied Black, "you, unlike the rest of us, live in the stratosphere." I made
no further comment but resisted the impulse to say that in any event I do not change my views and
votes on cases before this Court because of newspaper criticism.
H.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter 169-70 (Basic Bks. 1981) (footnote omitted) (The last reference
is to the Court's changing its position from Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) to West
Virginia State Board of Education, 319 U.S. 624.).
It is also worth noting that during the second pre-election debate between President George W. Bush
and Senator John Kerry, President Bush singled out Newdow's case as an illustration of a right claim that
should be rejected. President George Bush, Presidential Debate, Transcript: Second Presidential Debate
(Washington U., St. Louis, Mo., Oct. 8, 2004) (available at http://www.washingtonpost.conwp-
srv/politics/debatereferee/debate 1008.html). His explicit reaction supports a general "hunch" that in
Newdow's case the Justices understood the political dangers lurking in the option of granting Dr. Newdow his
claim. During the October 8, 2004 Presidential Debate, President Bush said:
Let me give you a couple of examples, I guess, of the kind of person I wouldn't pick [for the
Supreme Court]. I wouldn't pick a judge who said that the Pledge of Allegiance couldn't be said in
a school because it had the words "under God" in it. I think that's an example of a judge allowing
personal opinion to enter into the decision-making process as opposed to a strict interpretation of the
Constitution.
Id.
72. Warren Richey, When Do News Reports Influence Those in Black Robes? Christian Sci. Monitor 2 (July
7, 2004); Jeffrey Rosen, One Eye on Principle, the Other on the People's Will, 153 N.Y. Times § 4, 3 (July 4,
2004).
73. Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley's Opinions 26 (R.H. Russell 1901) (Dunne's character is noted for his
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To try to understand why the Court denied Dr. Newdow's right while accepting
Mr. Hamdi's, we should pause to contemplate subtle ties between the two cases and their
meaning in the context of Friedman's theory. Newdow and Hamdi are not random cases
simply representing the rights-related case law of last term. Rather, Newdow and Hamdi
taken together reflect a reaffirmation of the nation-state. 74 The nation-state is returned to
the public sphere as a cardinal principle, a construct that subordinates rights to the
greater needs of the nation as represented by the state, and that uses the powerful myths
of historical origin and uniqueness in order to support its superior status in its people's
worldview.
If I am correct and Newdow and Hamdi signify the reaffirmation of the nation-
state, then I would like to pose two questions to Friedman. First, is it possible that after
the events of September lth we are witnessing a reversal of the trend from the
traditional to the modem society? In both The Horizontal Society and The Republic of
Choice, Friedman recognizes social forces that militate against the modem, horizontal
society. He does not think these forces are powerful enough to withstand the rise of
modernity. Has Friedman underestimated the social forces working against the
horizontal society, which have grown more salient and powerful after September 11 th?
Was it impossible to predict the socio-cultural developments in the post-September 1 th
climate? Is it possible to say that today Friedman's theory should be inverted, that a
process is in the making whereby the "vertical" elements of society are gaining the upper
hand and the horizontal elements are receding, even becoming somewhat marginal?
Second, is it possible that we are confronted with social conditions quite
independent of traditional and horizontal societies? All societies, whether vertical or
horizontal, traditional or modem, experience centralization of power and a wilted culture
of rights during security crises. Is it possible that there are archetypal forces at work,
deep and primordial, which survive social changes? Historically, security crises
produced a setback to any culture of rights. Duties, rather than rights, become the
dominant mode of public thought.75  The French have a saying for predictable,
74. And because we are dealing with the United States, the only superpower in the beginning of the twenty-
first century, maybe even the imperial nation-state. For an interesting discussion of the nation-state and the
American constitutional order, see Mark E. Brandon, War And The American Constitutional Order, in The
Constitution in Wartime: BeyondAlarmism and Complacency 11 (Mark Tushnet ed., Duke U. Press 2005).
75. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (Justice Black stating that "Citizenship has its
responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time of war the burden is always heavier."); Schenck v. U.S.,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Justice Holmes observing that, "When a nation is at war many things that might be
said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort ... that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right."). This appears to be a reflexive reaction under conditions of crisis. Compare the dictum
of Chief Justice Moshe Smoira of Israel's Supreme Court. Chief Justice Smoira stated:
When the security of the state and the public peace are in grave danger, ordinary legal tools might
not be sufficient, and it is necessary to prefer the needs of state security over the protection of
individual liberties. In such a case the public mandates that every citizen sacrifices his rights for the
benefit of the public.
H.C. 16/48, Brun v. Prime Minister and Minister of Def, I P.D. 109, 112 (1948) (footnote omitted; emphasis
omitted) (quoted in Pnina Lahav, Judgment in Jerusalem: Chief Justice Simon Agranat and the Zionist Century
90-91 (U. Cal. Press 1997)). This dictum was delivered in 1948, the year the State of Israel came into
existence. Id. A militant right-wing Jewish organization, LEHI (The Stem Gang), assassinated United Nations
Envoy, Count Folke Bernadotte, in an effort to thwart international involvement in the Palestinian Israeli
conflict. Id. The nascent Israeli government reacted with massive administrative detentions of members of the
militant organization, and the Court's statement was delivered in the context of denying relief. Id.
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historically repetitive phenomena: "plus 9a change, plus c'est la mme chose." 76 If this
is correct, then should one conclude that Friedman's theories are simply irrelevant to the
Newdow and Hamdi jurisprudence? Yet is it a paradox to argue that a theory of social
change is irrelevant in the face of social changes brought about by peculiar
circumstances such as a security crisis?
IV. DR. NEWDOW, MR. HAMDI, AND THE NATION-STATE
Five years into the twenty-first century, it is too early to predict whether a vertical
society (surely different from the vertical society of the eighteenth century, but one with
more salient vertical elements) is at the gate. Still, it seems the events of September 11 th
and the rise of the national-security state delivered a setback to the horizontal society as
conceptualized by Friedman. The culture of rights is definitely experiencing a blow,
represented most forcefully by the PATRIOT Act, but also by voices discouraging
dissent and criticism of the government. 77  Lower court opinions supporting more
powers to the Executive Branch are another indication that a different trend is on the
march. Newdow and Hamdi should be understood and interpreted within this context.
The ingredient commonly thought to guarantee the well-being of the nation-state is
patriotism. Members of the nation-state-its subjects or citizens-are expected to place
their country above all values, most importantly their own lives. Patriots are willing to
defend their country to the bitter end. In return, they are immortalized as national
heroes. Viewed from this perspective, Dr. Newdow's right should be denied because, in
the Court's mind, God and the Nation are inextricable. It is one thing to add God to a
pledge, as was done on Flag Day, June 14, 1954, when the words "under God" were
added; it is quite another matter to remove God once people grew accustomed to the
association between God and nation. Patriotism is threatened when God is deliberately
removed from the Pledge. The cardinal reason for granting Mr. Hamdi's petition is
rooted in patriotism. It springs from reciprocity. Citizens should stand ready to fight
76. See also Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation vol. 2, 444 n. 4 (E.F.J. Payne
trans., Dover 1966) (for a somewhat different formulation, "Eadem, sed aliter," meaning the same things
happen again and again, only differently).
77. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 387 (2001). See also Sen. Jud. Comm., Anti-
Terrorism Policy Review, 107th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2001). Attorney General John Ashcroft testified:
We need honest, reasoned debate; not fearmongering. To those who pit Americans against
immigrants, and citizens against non-citizens; to those who scare peace-loving people with
phantoms of lost liberty; my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists-for they erode our
national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to
America's friends. They encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face of evil.
Id. Senator Zell Miller, remarks during the 2004 Republican National Convention, Remarks Made by Senator
Zell Miller, (New York, N.Y., Sept. 1, 2004) (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/01/politics/
campaign/O1TEXT-MILLER.html?ex=1100062800&en=d4O6l4ccaab6alf5&ei=5070) (Senator Miller stated
that "our nation is being tom apart and made weaker because of the Democrats' manic obsession to bring down
our Commander-in-Chief."); Alan Brinkley et al., The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties in an Age of
Terrorism (Richard C. Leone & Gregory Anrig, Jr., eds., Pub. Affairs 2003); Elaine Cassel, The War On Civil
Liberties: How Bush and Ashcroft Have Dismantled The Bill Of Rights (Lawrence Hill Bks. 2004); Nancy
Chang et al., Lost Liberties: Ashcroft and the Assault on Personal Freedom (Cynthia Brown ed., New Press
2003); David Cole & James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the
Name of National Security (New Press 2002); Nat Hentoff, The War on the Bill of Rights & the Gathering
Resistance (Seven Stories Press 2003).
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(sacrifice) for the country's survival; for its part, the country should treat its citizens with
care and not deny their liberty without due process of law.
An analysis of the Pledge is a good place to begin the effort to understand the
underlying problems intuitively grasped by the Justices. The Pledge posits "one nation
under God." 7 8 A nation "under God" invokes the metaphor of a marital union; the wife
is under the husband, erotically and otherwise. This metaphor has guided the
understanding of the relationship between the church and God throughout the Middle
Ages. The Nation, thus, merely replaces the church in asserting the sacred union. 79 If
the guiding metaphor is that of a family, then it is easy to see the citizens-members of
the Nation-as the product of this sacred union, and therefore entitled to special
privileges and immunities.
Another way of understanding the need to invoke patriotism in explaining the
significance of the relationship between God and nation is by consulting the etymology
and history of the term "patriotism." The Oxford English Dictionary traces the word to
1605, as the nation-state was in the making. Patriotism meant "love of or zealous
devotion to one's country" 8 ° and was rooted in the notion of fatherhood. The notion of a
patriot is traced to paternity-fatherhood and fatherland-and denotes the biological
affinity of the members of the national community. The transplantation of these notions
from family to nation (all who are children of the fatherland), and the inclusion of
persons who do not share biological genes, designated the rise of the nation-state.
Territory (fatherland) came to replace God, but not entirely. The fatherland could also
be the motherland, and its happy protection by God was not denied even in the face of
the emerging recognition of the principle of the separation of church and state.
Whether the nation-state is a trinity between God, land, and nation or whether
merely a union between God and nation as described in the Pledge, the historical fact
remains, that the idea of patriotism is rooted in the vertical society. It traces itself to a
nation's fathers, and assumes a relationship based upon status, not contract. As a
socially constructed notion, however, patriotism needs nurturing and sustenance. In a
nation of immigrants which had recently experienced a civil war, it should not be
surprising that a pledge of allegiance was introduced, requiring all children (the young
and impressionable) to swear allegiance to the nation (and the Union). 81
78. 4 U.S.C. § 4.
79. Jewish tradition similarly views the Jewish people as the beloved female betrothed to God. See Arthur
Green, Keter: The Crown of God in Early Jewish Mysticism 84 (Princeton U. Press 1997).
80. The Oxford English Dictionary 349 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed., Clarendon Press
1989). In 1596, the word appeared as denoting a fellow-countryman, compatriot, but in the meaning of love of
country it only appeared nine years later.
81. This may explain why a pledge is not customary in other western countries. The American need for
nurturing loyalty (discouraging un-Americanism) was well captured in Edward Everett Hale's story, The Man
Without a Country, also made into a play (The Slacker), and was widely taught in public schools at the
beginning of the twentieth century. Edward Everett Hale, The Man Without a Country (Harv. Classic Shelf
Fiction 1917). The man without a country was a young military officer convicted of treason during the War of
Independence, who cavalierly told the judge: "Damn the United States! I wish I may never hear of the United
States again!" Id. at 7. The officer was sentenced to have his wish fulfilled: never to set foot in the United
States, nor receive any information about the country. Id. Hale's story describes the misery of the young man,
exiled aboard United States navy ships for more than forty years, as he came to realize the barrenness of life
without a country. Id. His last wish was that a stone be placed in his memory, saying: "He loved his country
as no other man has loved her; but no man deserved less at her hands." Id. at 79. For a history of the
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Newdow and Hamdi came before the Court in the aftermath of September 11 th.
Mr. Hamdi's case fits squarely into the war atmosphere. The United States claimed he is
a member of the Taliban forces, caught in the battlefield while using his Kalashnikov
assault rifle against American soldiers. 82 The government designated him as an enemy
combatant because it relied on this version of events. The Justice Department insisted
that the President of the United States has the constitutional power to detain Mr. Hamdi
indefinitely, without access to counsel or due process.
At first glance, Dr. Newdow's case seems unrelated to these events. In fact, Dr.
Newdow launched his case before September 11 th. 83 But I suggest that the relationship
between the two is not farfetched or speculative. In reviewing Dr. Newdow's case, even
professionals very adept at compartmentalization cannot ignore the conditions of war and
their impact on patriotism. I believe the Justices must have experienced a connection
between the two cases.
84
There may not be an equivalent of a smoking gun to prove the Court was thinking
of the United States' involvement in war and reflecting on the role of patriotism in this
context. However, there are some clues that may indicate that patriotism influenced the
Court's decisions. The centerpiece of the Court's work during the last term revolved
around the tension between rights and national security. Rasul v. Bush85 was argued on
April 20, 2004, Rumsfeld v. Padilla86 was argued on April 28, 2004, and Hamdi was
argued on April 28, 2004. Thus, the Justices were busily reflecting on the conditions of
war presently enveloping the United States and the dangers associated with terrorism
even if they were not reading the newspapers. Moreover, the Court handed down the
Newdow and Hamdi opinions within two weeks of each other (Newdow on June 14,
2004; Hamdi on June 28, of 2004). Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the Justices
patriotic pedigree of the Pledge, see Ellis, supra n. 11. For an insightful discussion of patriotism and
citizenship, see Martha C. Nussbaum, For Love of Country? Debating the Limits of Patriotism (Beacon Press
1996).
82. See Br. for the Respt. at *4, Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2004 WL 724020 (The government labeled Hamdi
as an enemy combatant "[b]ased on interviews with Hamdi in Afghanistan and his association with the
Taliban."); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 345 (4th Cir. 2003) ("government asserts that Hamdi was in
Afghanistan bearing arms as a Taliban soldier when he was seized"); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp.
2d 527, 534, 3-4 (E.D. Va. 2002) (declaration of Michael H. Mobbs).
83. Docket for Case No. 00-16423, Newdow, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). Newdow first sued on March 8,
2000, before September 11 th, 2001. Id. While highly speculative, it certainly could be that had the United
States not experienced September 11 th, his case would end up differently. Compare the volatile case of who is
a Jew in Israel, in which a military officer in the Israeli army claimed that to be a Jew in Israel meant to be an
Israeli, not a Jew in accordance with Jewish law. See Lahav, supra. n. 75, at ch. 12. The officer, Shalit,
launched his petition to the High Court of Justice before the 1967 War. Id. With the revival of religious fervor
and messianism in Israel after the war, the Shalit case was upgraded into a cosmic question of national meaning
and survival. Id. Ultimately, Shalit and the secular camp supporting him lost to nationalist/religious forces.
Id.
84. The idea that one should refrain from critical speech for fear of demoralizing the population or abetting
the enemy has been in the air since September 11 th (as expected during security crises). The instinct that now
is not the time to send God back to the private sphere seems related to the notion that "when a nation is at war,"
certain speech-acts are intolerable. Both God and unanimity of opinion are popularly considered essential to
winning a struggle against evil.
85. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (Persons detained as "unlawful combatants" in the United States military base in
Guantanamo, Cuba, argued they were constitutionally entitled to have a hearing before a federal court.).
86. 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). Mr. Padilla, a United States citizen, was detained as an unlawful combatant for
purposes of interrogation in the context of the United States war against terrorism. Id. As of this writing, he is
still in detention without trial.
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decided to deliver Newdow on Flag Day.87  They must have been fully aware of the
symbolism attached to this decision and to the connections between the flag, patriotism,
the Pledge, and war in American legal culture.
Again, further anecdotal proof of the fact that the flag, the nation, and the war were
dominant cultural themes since 2001 is found in Huntington's book, Who Are We?
88
Dedicated to American national identity, its past and future, Huntington's book opens
with the following paragraph:
Charles Street, the principal thoroughfare on Boston's Beacon Hill, is a comfortable street
bordered by four-story brick buildings with apartments above antique stores and other
shops on the ground level. At one time on one block American flags regularly hung over
the entrances to the United States Post Office and the liquor store. Then the Post Office
stopped displaying the flag, and on September 11, 2001, the liquor store flag flew alone.
Two weeks later seventeen flags flew on this block, in addition to a huge Stars and Stripes
suspended across the street a short distance away. With their country under attack, Charles
Street denizens rediscovered their nation and identified themselves with it.
8 9
Not surprisingly, Huntington makes it very clear that he thinks the phrase "under God"
belongs in the Pledge.
90
Let me examine the rhetoric of the Newdow Court to show the significance of
patriotic nationalism for the resolution of the case. The opinion was decided five to
three, with the majority declining to undertake a substantive review of Dr. Newdow's
claims on the grounds that he lacked standing. 91 The very reliance on a technicality is
87. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2301. On August 3, 1949, President Truman signed the congressional statute
officially designating June 14 as Flag Day. Pub. L. No. 81-203, 63 Stat. 492 (1949). Five years later, on June
14, 1954, Congress inserted the words "under God" into the Pledge of Allegiance. Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat.
249 (1954). The Supreme Court's opinion in Newdow was released fifty years later, on Flag Day of 2004. 124
S. Ct. at 2301.
88. Huntington, supra n. 66.
89. Id. at 3.
90. Id. at 82. Huntington states:
Dr. Newdow [and the Ninth Circuit] got it right: atheists are "outsiders" in the American
community. As unbelievers, they do not have to recite the Pledge or to engage in any religiously
tainted practice of which they disapprove. They also, however, do not have the right to impose their
atheism on all those Americans whose beliefs now and historically have defined America as a
religious nation.
Id. Unlike the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor, Huntington has no problem acknowledging that the
American nation is Christian and its God is a Christian God. Id. at 83. "America is a predominantly Christian
nation with a secular government. Non-Christians may legitimately see themselves as strangers because they
or their ancestors moved to this 'strange land' founded and peopled by Christians ... " Id. at 66.
91. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2312. The majority stated: "We conclude that, having been deprived under
California law of the right to sue as next friend, Newdow lacks prudential standing to bring this suit in federal
court." Id. (Justice Scalia not participating). See Matthew J. Franck, Recusal Absurdity, http://
nationalreview.com/comment/franck200310220904.asp (Oct. 22, 2003) (On January 12, 2003, at a Religious
Freedom Day event sponsored by the Knights of Columbus, Justice Scalia stated that the Ninth Circuit decision
had "plausible support" in previous Supreme Court rulings and that the decision to remove "under God" was
not a task for the courts.). See also Suggestion for Recusal of J. Scalia, Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (available at
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supremecourt/briefs/02-1624/03-7.recuse.pdf) (Newdow requesting Scalia
recuse himself because he had shown that he had already decided on his case without properly reviewing all
materials). Justice Kennedy's position in this case is of particular interest. Justice Kennedy authored the
opinion in Lee v. Weisman, where a non-denominational prayer during graduation was declared
unconstitutional. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). The doctrinal reasons for this result were rooted in a "coercion" test, a
test that went beyond physical coercion to recognize the power of subtle influences such as peer pressure on
young minds. Id. at 585-86. It was quite rational to expect that Kennedy's reasoning would also apply to
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telling of the Court's determination to avoid the issue. Another revealing signal is that
not even one Justice came out in favor of a "God free" pledge.
Justice Stevens opened his opinion for the majority in Newdow with some ringing
rhetoric from his dissenting opinion in Texas v. Johnson.92 In Johnson, decided a few
months before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the Court held
that burning the American Flag was a permissible, if unwelcome, symbolic speech-act
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.93  Justice Stevens
dissented, believing that the flag was special and the matter ought to fall outside the
reach of the First Amendment. 94 Fifteen years later, in Newdow, speaking for himself
and four other Justices, he began with a quote from his 1989 dissent:
95
"The very purpose of a national flag is to serve as a symbol of our country,".... As its
history illustrates, the Pledge of Allegiance evolved as a common public acknowledgement
of the ideals that our flag symbolizes. Its recitation is a patriotic exercise designed to foster
national unity and pride in those principles.
96
Having wrapped the Pledge of Allegiance in the evocative flag, Justice Stevens
proceeded to emphasize the symbolism inherent in the date chosen to deliver the
Newdow opinion. June 14 was National Flag Day, a date determined by Congressional
legislation to commemorate the flag four years after the end of World War II. Congress
did not choose this date randomly. On June 14, 1777, the Stars and Stripes was
recognized as the United States's official flag. If this were not enough, June 14 was
symbolic for yet another event: on that day, five years after the declaration of National
Flag Day, Congress amended the Pledge to include the phrase "under God," a historical
fact acknowledged in Justice Stevens's introduction.
97
By choosing June 14 to deliver its Newdow opinion, the Court signaled it was well
aware of the patriotic weight attached to the day, and perfectly willing to enhance this
symbolism by making the appropriate decision. From now on, Americans will
remember June 14 not only as the day that turned the Stars and Stripes into the national
flag, not only as National Flag Day and the day Congress added the phrase "under God,"
but also as the date that the Supreme Court of the United States refused to allow an
atheist to tamper with the union between God and nation. The national narrative of the
young Ms. Newdow. While all agreed that Ms. Newdow could not be constitutionally required to participate in
the Pledge, the argument that she would feel subtly coerced to join her teacher and class was very strong.
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2306. In Texas v. Johnson, the flag burning case (Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in
this case opens the majority opinion in Newdow), Justice Kennedy wrote a moving opinion, explaining that
"The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are
right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result." 491 U.S. 397,
420-21 (1989). One would expect him to act likewise here. However, this time he silently joined the
majority's decision to deny the petition, perhaps convinced that the case was not ripe for decision. Newdow,
124 S. Ct. at 2304.
92. 491 U.S. 397.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 436.
95. It may well be that this was Justice Stevens's condition for joining the other four Justices and thereby
forming a majority to decide Newdow without proclaiming substantively on the validity of "under God."
96. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2305 (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 2360. "Congress... amended the text to add the words 'under God.' Act of June 14, 1954 ... 
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flag was a subtle way for the Court to signal that it was a patriotic court, loyal to the
nation's symbols. 98 The majority later invoked the need to exercise judicial restraint
"when matters of great national significance are at stake." 99  Those willing to read
between the lines would be amused by the final paragraph of the majority's opinion. The
Court ends with a statement concerning the prudence required to avoid judicial review of
private matters. Prudence would even more forcefully apply to precisely the opposite of
"the private"--to matters occurring in the public sphere such as the recitation of Pledge
of Allegiance. The majority comments, "When hard questions of domestic relations
[read 'public matters'] are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the
federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of
federal constitutional law." 100  Thus, Justice Stevens's majority opinion, while self-
described as based on nothing but a technicality-Dr. Newdow's lack of standing---does
recognize the significance of the familiar version of the Pledge for the culture of the
American nation-state.
The three concurring Justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and
Justice Thomas-are much more open about their feelings. They like the Pledge exactly
as it is and would not part with the phrase "under God." 10 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist
opens his concurring opinion with a statement about the patriotic meaning of the Pledge:
To the millions of people who regularly recite the Pledge, and who have no access to, or
concern with, such legislation or legislative history, "under God" might mean several
different things: that God has guided the destiny of the United States, for example, or that
the United States exists under God's authority. How much consideration anyone gives to
the phrase probably varies, since the Pledge itself is a patriotic observance focused
primarily on the flag and the Nation, and only secondarily on the description of the
Nation. 102
The Chief Justice, an amateur historian, proceeds to show how pervasive the appeal to
God has been in various statements of "the Nation's leaders." Being a member of the
national leadership himself, he is aware of the fact that the invocation of God's name
98. The seminal case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, holding that children cannot be
coerced into participating in the Pledge, similarly announced its opinion on June 14, 1943. 319 U.S. 624.
Justice Jackson wrote that "the flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of
communicating ideas." Id. at 632 (thereby endorsing the Pledge while exempting Jehovah's Witnesses from
the requirement of pledging allegiance).
99. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2308.
100. Id. at 2312.
101. The Chief Justice's concurrence was made of two parts. The first rejected the majority's holding that
standing was lacking. Id. at 2312. Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas joined this part. The second
addressed the meaning of the phrase "under God" in American history, and was joined only by Justice
O'Connor. Id. Justice O'Connor, however, wrote her own concurrence, arguing that her endorsement test can
work in this case and that its "proper" application would result in upholding the Pledge as it is. Id. at 2321-23.
She did concede this was a "close question." Newdow, t24 S. Ct. at 2323. Justice Thomas was not content
with either approach and filed his own concurring opinion. Id. at 2327. In his view, the precedent of Lee v.
Weisman would require the elimination of "under God" from the Pledge, and therefore should be overruled.
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2330. Justice Thomas also saw fit to "take this opportunity to begin the process of
rethinking the Establishment Clause," challenging the idea that it has been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 2328.
102. Id. at 2317. The Chief Justice assumes an almost unanimous degree of conformism in this matter. He
does not pause to reflect on millions who may be puzzled by the tie between God and the nation, either because
to them God is a Western concept, or because they would like to see a separation between God and State.
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need not be tied to any deep belief in the divine. Rather, it could be a perfunctory, even
knee jerk, appeal to conventional expectations. 10 3 It could be no more than a paraphrase
of Justice Brandeis's formula for assuring American Jews that the support of Zionism
would not jeopardize the appearance of their loyalty to the United States. Justice
Brandeis's formula was "to be good Americans, we must be better Jews, and to be better
Jews, we must become Zionists." 104 The Chief Justice states that "Reciting the Pledge,
or listening to others recite it, is a patriotic exercise, not a religious one; participants
promise fidelity to our flag and our Nation, not to any particular God, faith or
church."' 10 5  The paraphrase would be: "to be a good American one must be a good
patriot, and to be a good patriot one must pledge allegiance to the nation under God."
God, then, is the sugar in the pie of patriotism. The best proof for this, says the
Chief Justice, comes from the national anthem:
[A]dditional support [for] this idea is our national anthem, "The Star-Spangled
Banner,".... The last verse ends with these words: "Then conquer we must, when our
cause it is just, And this be our motto: 'In God is our trust.' And the star-spangled banner
in triumph shall wave O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave!"
10 6
Justice O'Connor joins the Chief Justice's concurrence "in full" and yet takes a different
approach. 10 7 She weaves together nationalism, patriotism, and God, invoking history as
well as contemporary culture and normative assumptions. 10 8 She begins with history,
tracing the origins of the American nation to religious refugees, stating that "It is
unsurprising that a Nation founded by religious refugees and dedicated to religious
freedom should find references to divinity in its symbols, songs, mottoes, and oaths.
Eradicating [these] references would sever ties to a history that sustains this Nation even
today." 10 9  These references, she continues, all fall under the category of ceremonial
deism, a category which should be distinguished from religious practices, and which
therefore is immune to the Establishment Clause.1 10 Clearly, according to O'Connor,
the facts that the Pledge was introduced while the "refugees" have had already been
masters of the land, and the phrase "under God" was introduced when the country had
already been universally recognized as one of two superpowers, do not disqualify the
103. The tendency of a nation's leadership to carry God's name in vain has been observed since biblical
times. See Isaiah 58:2 (King James) ("Yet they seek me daily, and delight to know my ways, as a nation that
did righteousness, and forsook not the ordinance of their God.").
104. See Philippa Strum, Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism 115 (U. Press Kan. 1993).
105. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2320 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 2319 (citation omitted). In keeping with the most salient aspect of the horizontal society-its
vibrant technological innovations-the cite used by the Chief Justice Rehnquist for the National Anthem is a
website. Id. (citing Balt. County Pub. Lib., Fort McHenry: Birthplace of Our National Anthem, http://
www.bcpl.net/-etowner/anthem.html (accessed Aug. 7, 2005)).
107. Id. at 2321. Justice O'Connor states: "But while the history presented by THE CHIEF JUSTICE
illuminates the constitutional problems this case presents, I write separately to explain the principles that guide
my own analysis of the constitutionality of that policy." Id.
108. Justice O'Connor differs from the Chief Justice in her insistence that an appropriate application of her
endorsement test would result in upholding the constitutionality of the Pledge. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2321-27.
Hence, the thrust of her opinion is doctrinal. In this part of the article, I only deal with her theories related to
the link between patriotism, nationalism, and God.
109. Id. at 2322 (footnote omitted).
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Pledge's formula from being an incidence of the old ceremonial deism embraced by the
early "refugees."'
' 1
"In any event" (as Friedman likes to say), 1 2 Justice O'Connor urges the reader not
to give too much weight to the mention of God. The American nation should be the
focus of the inquiry:
Even if taken literally, the phrase [under God] is merely descriptive; it purports only to
identify the United States as a Nation subject to divine authority. That cannot be seen as a
serious invocation of God or as an expression of individual submission to divine
authority. 
113
Later, she urges her audience to remember that the phrase is a "simple reference to a
generic 'God' and that it is brief (only two out of the thirty one words of the Pledge).114
She ends her opinion by tying God and religion to the birth of the Nation and to the
Nation's lofty dedication to liberty:
Certain ceremonial references to God and religion in our Nation are the inevitable
consequences of the religious history that gave birth to our founding principles of liberty.
It would be ironic indeed if this Court were to wield our constitutional commitment to
religious freedom so as to sever our ties to the traditions developed to honor it. 115
O'Connor may be somewhat uneasy about her attachment to the phrase. It may
well be that the awkwardness she experiences pushes her to flatten the idea of God, turn
it into something generic, devoid of substantive content, light and superficial. God, in
O'Connor's rendition, is actually the white between the stripes of the flag. You cannot
have the flag without the white, but you hardly notice it, and hardly nurture feelings
toward it.
Patriotism, devotion to country, and love of nation drive the Newdow Court. The
emphasis on patriotism is the starch binding the majority to the concurring Justices.
How is Hamdi related to these themes?
Mr. Hamdi's case is grounded in his status as citizen of the United States. The
United States government recognized this special status when it removed Mr. Hamdi
from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where all other detainees caught in Afghanistan have been
kept, and transferred him to a military brig in the United States. 116 The fact that Mr.
Hamdi was born on United States soil and was held on United States soil make him a
member of the Nation and it is this special status that ties his case to Dr. Newdow's. If
111. Id. "It is unsurprising that a Nation founded by religious refugees and dedicated to religious freedom
should find references to divinity in its symbols, songs, mottoes, and oaths." Id. (footnote omitted). The
choice of words, "religious refugees," is interesting in that it evokes the ubiquitous refugee problems of the
twentieth century, and implies a dimension of victimhood rather than the glorious triumph of pioneers who
arrived to settle a new land. It could be read as a rhetorical move designed to subtly plant in the readers' mind
the notion that the cause under attack (the ability to invoke God) is just.
112. Freidman, supra n. 2, at 99, 101-02, 107. (Friedman's The Horizontal Society is peppered with this
phrase).
113. Newdow, 124S. Ct. at2325.
114. Id. at 2326.
115. Id. at 2327.
116. Compare Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633, with Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686. The United States similarly transferred
John Walker Lindh, popularly known as the American Taliban, to American soil as soon as it was discovered
that he was an American citizen.
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Newdow describes a Nation "under God" promising "liberty and justice for all," Hamdi
depicts the special relations between the Nation and its citizens.
117
Citizenship appears to be central to all of the opinions in Hamdi. The plurality, led
by Justice O'Connor, insists several times that Mr. Hamdi is "an American citizen
detained on American soil."'118  The relationship between the Nation, its soil, and
citizenship is highlighted as essential and powerful. The plurality insists Mr. Hamdi's
status as a son of the Nation (a citizen) makes his right to be "free from physical
detention by one's own government" so "elemental," of a "fundamental nature," and a
"core right."1 19  Justices Souter and Ginsburg, while disagreeing with the plurality's
position that Congress has authorized the indefinite detention of "enemy combatants,"
still agree that citizenship is crucial. 12  They, too, highlight the fact that Mr. Hamdi is
"an American citizen held on home soil incommunicado." 12 1  Justices Scalia and
Stevens similarly assume that the fact that Mr. Hamdi is a citizen on United States soil is
dispositive. "Where the citizen is captured outside and held outside the United States,
the constitutional requirements may be different," they note, presumably realizing well
that they are creating a dictum. 122 Scalia and Stevens are even more adamant about the
rights stemming from the status of citizenship. The plurality would allow detention of a
citizen on United States soil if a "neutral decision maker" concludes that the citizen
indeed falls into the Executive's definition of an enemy combatant. 123  Scalia and
Stevens would accept only a determination by a federal court. A United States citizen,
they insist, cannot be constitutionally detained without trial unless Congress has
suspended the writ of habeas corpus.124
There is a catch, however, that connects the seemingly radical protection
guaranteed by Scalia and Stevens to the conventional concept of the Nation: "Citizens
aiding the enemy have been treated as traitors subject to the criminal process."'
12 5
Nothing short of treason comes to mind when a child of the Nation is found behind the
enemy lines. 126 Indeed, Justices Scalia and Stevens refer to Mr. Hamdi as a "presumed
117. It is even possible to further press this point and argue that while Newdow is about the relationship
between God and the Nation (the Nation is "under" God), Hamdi is about the relationship between the Nation
and its children.
118. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2638. Three Justices note that the case deals with an American citizen on
American soil. Id. at 2635, 2652, 2669. O'Connor, for the plurality, mentions this fact four times. Id. at 2635,
2638, 2648 (plurality). Souter, in his concurrence, mentions this fact three times. Id. at 2652, 2659 (Souter &
Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Scalia, in his dissent, mentions this fact once. Id. at
2669 (Scalia & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
119. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2646, 2650.
120. Id. at 2659 (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2673 (Scalia & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
123. Id. at 2660 (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2671 (Scalia & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
125. Id. at 2663. They also suggest that "our constitutional tradition has been to prosecute... for treason or
some other crime." Id. at 2660. Presumably "the other crime" they refer to is related to treason.
126. Treason is a very potent concept and tool, implicating the very survival of the commonwealth. It has
been known to be manipulable by governments for the purpose of whipping public opinion into support of the
current government and silencing criticism. See generally Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The Use of
Legal Procedures for Political Ends 62-95 (Princeton U. Press 1961). The harmful ramifications of treason
charges led the American founders to provide highly specific requirements for the offense in Article III of the
Constitution. The case of another "American Taliban," John Walker Lindh, is instructive. Immediately after
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citizen"-a very potent adjective. Justice Thomas, while permitting the Executive to
detain both citizens and aliens inside or outside United States territory, agrees with
Scalia and Stevens about the characterization of citizens such as Hamdi, saying that these
,127are not "loyal citizen[s]. '  Scalia and Stevens would subject such disloyalty to a
criminal trial, while Thomas would allow administrative detention; all three make note of
the connection between citizenship and loyalty to the Nation. The distance from here to
the Pledge of Allegiance, designed specifically to cultivate loyalty to the Nation is rather
short. Chief Justice Rehnquist's observation in Newdow makes it explicit:
I do not believe that the phrase "under God" in the Pledge converts its recital into a
"religious exercise".... Instead, it is a declaration of belief in allegiance and loyalty to
the United States flag and the Republic that it represents.
12 8
Eight Justices would recognize a constitutional right to be free of arbitrary physical
detention to all citizens on United States soil. Why? Their explanation that they find
this right in the Constitution itself is not persuasive. The eight explain that the right is
rooted in the Due Process Clause. 129 The guarantee of Due Process, however, speaks of
persons, not of citizens. 13  Indeed, most of the quotes offered by the Justices in support
of the proposition that citizens were always singled out for special treatment refer to
persons, not to citizens.
Why do the Justices ignore the clear language of the text and narrow the protection
to "citizens on the home soil?" I suggest the reason is their concept of the Nation and
their understanding of the nation-state. The Justices conceive of the Nation as a distinct
entity with an exclusive heritage. This nation needs protection (through the Pledge) and
it in turn protects (through the extension of rights). The right to physical liberty, the
Court implies, has been developed by and for the people, and therefore, when times are
rough, is limited to them alone. For this reason, the plurality speaks in one breath of "the
values that this country holds dear" and "the privilege that is American citizenship."'
13 1
The heritage of rights, therefore, is not universal but particular. It applies
exclusively to the Nation and its children. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Scalia, and Stevens
are even more explicit than the plurality about the proposition that the Nation, not some
normative philosophy such as Kant's or Dworkin's about the supremacy of a categorical
his capture in Afghanistan, Attorney General Ashcroft declared that "Youth is not an absolution for treachery."
Edwin Dobb, Should John Walker Lindh Go Free? On the Rights of the Detained,
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mi I I l/is_1824_304/ai 85882844 (accessed Feb. 23, 2005). Dobb's
essay suggests that Lindh's trial was "an opportunity for the country to give shape to its wrath." Id. No proof
of Lindh's treacherous conduct has been offered at trial, but as part of the plea agreement, Lindh accepted guilt
on a charge that was not directly related to terrorism: violation of a 1999 executive order forbidding American
citizens from contributing "services" to the Taliban. Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad,
http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/0303 I Ofa fact2 (Mar. 10, 2003).
127. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2678. Justice Thomas would also allow the Executive to decide who is a loyal
citizen, whereas the rest of the Court would require different gradations of independent review of this matter.
Id.
128. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2319 (majority).
129. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2646-47.
130. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Constitution distinguishes between citizens and persons, and most of the
Bill of Rights speaks of persons, not citizens. Id. at amend. I-XXVI. The first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment recognizes the "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States," but then proceeds to
grant the right of due process to persons. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648 (plurality).
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imperative, is the fountain from which rights flow. These Justices trace the values the
Nation holds dear-primarily the elemental liberty (mentioned in the Pledge of
Allegiance?)-to the Nation's roots. The thirteenth-century Magna Carta, guaranteeing
the right of habeas corpus to the English barons, is the pedigree they invoke. 
13 2
The myth of origin, shaping the Nation as an entity committed to liberty since King
John set his seal to the Magna Carta on June 1, 1215 (another June date, if one is inclined
to fortify the symbolism of the month of June), long before Columbus discovered
America, ties Hamdi to Newdow. God, flag, national soil, citizenship, and liberty are
woven into a triumphant national narrative. Justices Scalia and Stevens go even further
than Justices Souter and Ginsburg in invoking an imagined community more than eight
centuries old. They emphasize the ethnic Anglo-Saxon roots of the American nation-
state: "The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers
has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive.' '133 They
also mention the Anglo-Saxon roots of the offense of treason, analogize United States
citizens to British subjects, and invoke that great eighteenth-century English legal
authority, Blackstone, as the source of authority and guidance in this area. 134 Ethnicity,
the essence of nationhood, thereby joins God, flag, national soil, citizenship, and liberty.
Together they make "the Nation" and justify the protection of its children against
occasional executive fiat. In the process, the Pledge's glorious promise of "liberty and
justice for all" is transformed into a narrow guarantee of liberty and justice to United
States citizens on United States soil.
13 5
132. Id. at 2662 (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Whether insisting on
the careful scrutiny of emergency claims or on a vigorous reading of § 4001 (a), we are heirs to a tradition given
voice 800 years ago by Magna Carta, which, on the barons' insistence, confined executive power by 'the law of
the land."' Id. at 2659. "The struggle between subject and Crown continued, and culminated in the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679, described by Blackstone as a 'second magna charta, and stable bulwark of our liberties."'
Id. at 2662 (citation omitted).
133. Id. at2661.
134. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660-61. Justice Scalia is an ardent devotee of Blackstone and prides himself for
relying on the English eighteenth-century scholar rather than on "external" sources for purposes of deciding
what the law is. One is reminded of his dissent in Lee v. Weisman, a case of extreme doctrinal relevance to
Newdow, where Justice Scalia scolded Justice Kennedy's majority opinion for relying on Freud rather than on
Blackstone. Id. at 2684 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) ("I see no warrant for
expanding the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty-a brand of coercion that, happily,
is readily discernible to those of us who have made a career of reading the disciples of Blackstone rather than
of Freud."). Free association reminds one that Freud, the Austrian Jew, lost his citizenship through Nazi fiat,
and found shelter in England, home of the Anglo-Saxon Blackstone. Freud's story, when considered
historically, may prove the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon system; when considered normatively, however, it
may prove the danger lurking in nativist impulses, regardless of ethnic origins. Attaching rights to citizens
rather than to persons may tempt governments to strip non-citizens of basic human dignity. See Alexander M.
Bickel, The Morality of Consent 53-54 (Yale U. Press 1975). For a brilliant discussion, see Seyla Benhabib,
The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens ch. 2 (Cambridge U. Press 2004).
135. In Newdow, Chief Justice Rehnquist, somewhat facetiously, points out that Dr. Newdow did not ask to
remove the phrase "'with liberty and justice for all"' from the Pledge. See Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2320
(Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor & Thomas, JJ., concurring). It would have been interesting to see the Chief
Justice's reaction to a petition to replace "all" with "American citizens." Of course, the Chief Justice could use
the legal distinction between action and omission to justify a denial of such a claim. From the rhetorical
perspective of vindicating the national myth, however, "all" sounds much more glorious than "all citizens."
One possible interpretation of the Chief Justice's remark is that the "noble lie" captured by the Pledge should
better be kept intact. In this context, it is interesting to reflect on Yaser Essam Hamdi's grandfather in Mecca
of the early twentieth century. Many in the Middle East at the time, particularly the merchant classes of which
the elder Hamdi was one, admired the British for their civility and fine principles of government. It took time
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I have already mentioned that Mr. Hamdi was a dual citizen, and I would like to
discuss this point before I return to Friedman's theories. Mr. Hamdi was born in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, and therefore was classified as an American citizen. Citizenship was
vested in Mr. Hamdi for the simple reason that the Fourteenth Amendment bestows
citizenship on anybody born on United States soil. Apparently, Esam and Nadiah
Hamdi, Yaser's parents, never intended to make the United States their home. Between
the age of three when he arrived in Saudi Arabia and his departure to Afghanistan, Mr.
Hamdi did not travel outside the country he has considered and still considers his home.
After Mr. Hamdi returned to Saudi Arabia, he gave an interview in which he said
"he had not even been aware he was American until 'they sent me to Virginia from
Guantanamo."' 136 The interview implies that when he arrived in the United States his
English was not fluent. 137 His father told the interviewer that he knew that Saudi law
prohibited dual citizenship. 138 The interview states that "Both he and his father said they
assumed that when Mr. Hamdi received his Saudi identity card when he turned 18, 'he
was Saudi, not American."' ' 139  We learn that once Mr. Hamdi was removed from
Guantanamo Bay to a military brig on American soil, he was put in solitary confinement
where he was often shackled and strip searched. 14 0  Upon realizing the privileged
treatment stemmed from his status as a United States citizen, Mr. Hamdi recalls telling
his captors/fellow citizens, "If the American citizenship is what is keeping me here, then
take it. Take it! Send me back to Guantanamo."' 14 1 A look at the agreement between
Mr. Hamdi and the United States of America signed prior to his release reveals an
executive branch very tight-fisted about the extension of United States citizenship. Mr.
Hamdi was required to sign that he "considers himself to be a citizen of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia," and that:
Hamdi agrees to appear before a diplomatic or consular office of the United States at the
United States Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, formally to renounce any claim that he
may have to United States nationality pursuant to Section 349(a)(5). This provision is
without prejudice to the right of the United States to determine that Hamdi lost United
States nationality at an earlier time. Hamdi further agrees to so appear within seven (7)
days of arriving in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
agreement. 142
to discover that what Britain felt were sacred principles at home were not necessarily what it thought
appropriate for its colonies and dominions.





141. Brinkley, supra n. 34, at A4. But see the assertion by Hamdi's attorney, Frank Dunham, "When you've
been in solitary confinement for three years and somebody puts a piece of paper in front of you that says you
can get out of jail free if you sign it, you don't really worry too much about the rest of the fine print." Phil
Hirschkom & Nik Robertson, Hamdi Voices Innocence, Joy About Reunion, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/14/hamdi/index.html (Oct. 14, 2004).
142. Settlement Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and Yasser Essam
Hamdi Regarding the Deportation and Citizenship of Yasser Essam Hamdi (Sept. 17, 2004) (available at
http://news.public.findlaw.comihdocs/docsfhamdi/91704stlagrmnt.htm). In Section 13 Hamdi also agreed to
waive any and all claims he might have against the United States under United States law, foreign law, or
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In his interview with the New York Times, Mr. Hamdi said he accepted the condition
that he renounce United States citizenship. 14 3 Indeed he acted upon it "with no regret, he
said, almost as soon as he stepped off the United States military contract plane in Riyadh
on Oct. I L" 144 When approached to put his signature to the agreement, Mr. Hamdi
signed in Arabic, his native tongue. 145 Surely, there are many American citizens whose
native tongue is not English, or who feel more comfortable signing their names in their
native tongue. However, given all we know about Mr. Hamdi's personal history, it is
quite likely that his signature in Arabic was yet another subtle statement that he felt like
a Saudi, not like an American, and that he was using the technical fact of his place of
birth, because it was the only window of opportunity to get his freedom.
This background could be problematic for the reasoning in Mr. Hamdi's case. Let
me begin by saying that Mr. Hamdi is not the typical dual citizen. He is not the person
who feels at home in two (or more) countries and cultures. Nor is he ambivalent about
his ties to more than one country. He seems to think of himself as a Saudi citizen and
not to value United States citizenship as such. Had the Court expressed an interest in
Mr. Hamdi's thoughts or objective ties to the United States, it may have found that his
lawyers were invoking his citizenship for instrumental reasons. The fact he was born on
United States soil could distinguish him from other Guantanamo detainees and afford
him more efficient, quicker relief.
What did the Court have to say about the meaning of Mr. Hamdi's American
citizenship? Justices Scalia and Stevens allude to his dual nationality when they call him
a "presumed American citizen." 146 Justice Thomas implies that he is a disloyal citizen,
and maybe implies further that he thereby lost his right to due process. 147 The majority,
however, is silent. No detail about Mr. Hamdi, the person, emerges from the opinions.
Clearly, the Court chose to view Mr. Hamdi not as a person but rather as an abstraction
of citizenship, but why?
One may argue that if the threads connecting Newdow and Hamdi are patriotism
and nationhood, then the Court could have easily upheld Mr. Hamdi's detention by
insisting that his claim to citizenship was impaired. Why did six Justices (the plurality,
Souter, and Ginsburg) choose to avoid this path and ignore the issue of technical
citizenship? I suggest these Justices did so deliberately, in order to emphasize and
solidify the concept of the nation-state. Protection extended formally, based on one's
formal status regardless of background, intent and actions, elevates the Nation into a
mighty protector. It is true that only children of the Nation are afforded the process
thereby due. But it is also true that this approach guarantees the window is firmly shut
international law. Hamdi's renunciation of citizenship was repeated in an additional paragraph titled
"Petitioner's Signature." Id. at 4.
143. Brinkley, supra n. 34.
144. Id.
145. Settlement Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and Yasser Essam
Hamdi Regarding the Deportation and Citizenship of Yasser Essam Hamdi, supra n. 142, at 4.
146. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660.
147. See id. at 2677-78. Indeed, twelve of the September II hijackers were Saudi citizens, a fact that invites
reflection on the possible role of Saudi Arabia in nurturing hostility toward the United States. See The 9/11
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
231-35 (U.S. Govt. Prtg. Off. 2004).
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before the hand that will separate one class of citizens from another on the basis of
perceived loyalty. Under the Court's approach, all citizens are protected equally,
regardless of how un-American they might be. This result, it appears, not only would
put a cap on the powers of the executive branch, 148 but would also reaffirm Justice
Jackson's celebrated rhetoric about the greatness of the American Nation in another
famous pledge case:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are149
any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
To summarize: Dr. Newdow and Mr. Hamdi both represented, in various
mutations, the horizontal society; each asked the Court to uphold rights in keeping with
the culture of rights that is so central to The Republic of Choice. Dr. Newdow combined
a traditional right of parenthood with a request for an audacious and novel remedy, very
much in tune with the horizontal society. Mr. Hamdi asked for a very traditional right,
harking back to the early constitutional monarchy in England, but his peculiarly modem
status as a technical citizen complicated his claim. The Court rejected the audacious
right proposed by Dr. Newdow and only partially agreed to extend the conventional right
to Mr. Hamdi, while ignoring altogether the factor of dual citizenship.
I tried to show that the Court did not ground its reasoning in modernist, horizontal
understanding of society. Rather, the Court's reasons pointed in the direction of an
exclusivist, nationalist understanding of society and its polity. In other words, it would
be a mistake to understand the Court as embracing freedom of choice by ignoring Mr.
Hamdi's dual nationality. Quite the contrary, the blind eye turned on Mr. Hamdi's dual
nationality signaled discomfort with the republic of choice.
If one accepts the theory that the Supreme Court, in exercising judicial review,
participates in a national seminar about the central meaning of the American Republic,
then the Court may be both echoing and shaping a trend away from the horizontal and
towards a vertical, nationalist exclusivity. 150  The Nation acknowledges its vertical
position "under God," encourages its children to develop allegiance to itself, and in turn
protects these children when they are denied due process of law. One may even go
further to speculate that Mr. Hamdi, the borderline case, is benefiting from the
determination of the Court to protect American citizens (particulary patriots who take the
Pledge of Allegiance seriously) from arbitrary executive denial of liberty. It is not
altogether farfetched to assume that but for the Court's concern for "real" United States
citizens whose fate may be at stake, Mr. Hamdi would not have found a sympathetic ear
at the Court. What does Friedman say about this analysis?
148. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2650 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)) ("We
have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights
of the Nation's citizens.").
149. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (footnote omitted).
150. Supreme Court Justices "are inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar." Eugene V. Rostow, The
Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 208 (1952).
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THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE
V. FRIEDMAN ON NATIONALISM
Chapter three of Friedman's The Horizontal Society is devoted to the issue of
nationalism and its variations. Friedman understands well the forces feeding the
ideology of nation building, the politics of exclusion, and the role of ethnicity:
"Nationalism is, and has to be, a blood brother ofethnicity." 151 He quotes with approval
Ernst Gellner's observation that nationalism is "a principle which holds that the political
and national unit should be congruent."' 152 Friedman understands nationalism as a social
construct, where patriots "[massage the nation] into life" 153 through such means as
myths of origin, national anthems, or the telling of a heroic didactic narrative of a nation
gloriously overcoming adversity. This description applies quite literally to the Rehnquist
and O'Connor concurrences in Newdow. One can imagine them massaging the Nation's
heart into life and placing it directly under God. Friedman also points out that immigrant
nations like the United States "seem to be prone to outbursts of ferocious patriotism, and
even nativism,"' 154 and ferocious patriotism may well explain at least the concurrences in
Newdow.
Nationalism and nativism, as I argued above, may also explain the case of Hamdi.
The Court protected Mr. Hamdi, very marginally, despite the fact that he was an alleged
Saudi Taliban and only technically a United States citizen. Friedman views dual
citizenship as another major indicator of the horizontal society, stating that "Dual
citizenship... implies some kind of plural equality socially. It rejects the idea that
membership in a country is confined to a tightly defined and exclusive group, or that it
requires a total commitment of hearts and minds."
' 155
Friedman believes--or at least he believed at the end of the twentieth century as he
was writing The Horizontal Society-that we have been witnessing a process whereby:
[T]he unified nation dissolves, politically and culturally, into many little subnations, into
bits and pieces. There is a serious question as to whether the nation in the sense of the
group of groups, the loyalty of loyalties, still exists in any meaningful way.... [I]n the
United States, a case could be made that the "nation" is not a nation anymore.
In characteristic fashion, Friedman is sensitive to nuance. He does not make a bold
statement about the end of nationalism. Rather, he concedes that "There is plenty of old-
fashioned patriotism left."'157 Yet he suggests that "It is a question of changes in the
margins-of more or less."
' 158
It may be time for Friedman to reconsider his theory in light of the post-September
11 th climate of the twenty-first century. In light of the Court's performance in Newdow
151. Friedman, supra n. 2, at 82.
152. Id. Friedman suggests that nationalism "is the glue that keeps the nation state from flying apart." Id at
86.
153. Id. at 92-95.
154. Id. at 96.
155. Friedman, supra n. 2, at 160.
156. Id. at 117. Friedman also says: "Indeed some sort of cultural evolution seems to be in progress,
redefining the nation, recasting the very idea." Id. at 118.
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and Hamdi, situated in the war against terrorism, is the "change in the margin"
mentioned by Friedman going in the other direction? Are we seeing, more or less (as
Friedman says), a reversal of the trend towards horizontalism and a retreat into nativism
and nationalism?
If I am correct, then there are at least two possible ways to interpret recent
developments. We may be witnessing a reversal of the trend discussed by Friedman.
The horizontal society may be receding in the face of the rise of nationalism and
verticalism. Of course, it is evidently correct that the twenty-first-century nationalism is
deploying modem means to reassert itself, and that in this sense it partakes in the
horizontal society. But it is still nationalism, unleashing powers we thought were tamed
and subdued in the second half of the twentieth century.
Newdow and Hamdi may represent a shift rooted in yet another phenomenon.
Perhaps it is not that the horizontal society is experiencing a transformation (in the
margins, more or less) back to a vertical society, but rather that periods of national
security crisis have always been, and probably will always remain, periods of
centralization (verticalization) and ferocious patriotism, regardless of whether society is
pre-modem, modem, or post-modem. If this is correct and we are witnessing societal
behavior under crisis, then the question of the validity of the culture of rights celebrated
by Friedman is again put into question.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lawrence Friedman has a middle name, Meir. Meir was a great rabbi in the
Talmudic era and, true to his namesake, Friedman has been a grand rabbi of the law and
society movement and of the discipline of legal history, not only in the United States, but
also throughout the world. Meir is a Hebrew word; it is the present tense conjugation of
the verb to enlighten. Lawrence Meir Friedman has been enlightening us, and having an
enlightening influence on all of us--on me certainly-for several decades. It is an honor
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